Question [inaud] I have a question about knowing and about learning [the more education you get], the less creative initiative you have. And, I see that's the case with a lot of people. Some people would just stay in school for their whole lives, or something like that. But, I've worked on various research projects, including, discovering the genetic root of cardio-myopathy and various other things, like researching the nervous system. And, I was wondering why these research programs aren't as effective as they could be; or why you think that the MD-PhDs that I work with, don't have the creative ability, so they can come up with the idea of discovering the root of these principles?

LaRouche: This very problem is, of course, one of the contributing reasons why I answered the question, some years ago, at a conference--a side session--on youth organizing, at a conference in Virginia: On what do we do, since the universities stink, how do we get an education? I said: Well, let's start with Gauss in 1799, exposition on the issue of the fundamental theorem of algebra, and proceed from that to history. That, the point there, of course, is, that what Gauss did--he did something very important at that point, in this paper: He attacked the two most influential and dangerous mis-leaders in scientific work in that time--Leonhard Euler and Joseph Lagrange. And the curse of science to the present day, is that the ideas, the empiricist system, or its positivist outgrowth, as represented by Euler and Lagrange in that matter, the anti- Leibniz forces of Euler and Lagrange, has been the curse of all scientific work to the present time.

Most scientists, today, even if they're competent in some degree, are fundamentally incompetent in the most fundamental principles of science. And, what Gauss does--young Gauss, the student of Abraham Kaestner--attacks d'Alembert, Euler, and Lagrange, on this issue.

The basic issue--and defined the complex domain, even though the complex domain was implicitly defined before then, even by Kepler, and before Kepler by the Classical Greek geometers. That is, the pre-Euclidean, Classical Greek geometers, typified by the Pythagoreans, and the School of Plato. This is the ancient Classics.

Now, as Plato emphasized, the idea of discovery is based on a very simple, and what should be obvious principle of, among other things, biology. And, if you don't understand this principle, how can you know anything about human biology? What's raised by Plato, is the point that, you do not know the universe, from the experience of your senses. The senses are something, which you get from sense organs, which are part of your biology--just like the sense organs of any dog, any monkey. So, human knowledge is not based on sense perception. That only qualifies you to get you into a zoo cage, as a monkey, or ape. That, Plato makes the point, and then explains it, he brings it up an the analogy, the heurism in The Republic: That what we call sense perception, is a result of biological tissue inside the human body. What we think we sense, with the mind, is not what happened. What we sense, is the effect of something on these sense organs, which radiate, like shadows, something they were stimulated by. The question is: What is outside your skin, which tickles your sense organ, which then causes your mind to say, "What is it?" "It's an experience." "Yes, the experience is true. But, it's the experience of your sense organ, not the experience of the world outside your skin."

That's the beginning of knowledge. That's the beginning of science.

Now, how do you know, what exists outside your skin? How do you know what exists beyond the scope of what your sense organs reflect to your mind? You have to find an aperture. What is the aperture? The aperture is call "a paradox," an ontological paradox. You find that the sense organ, sense-certainty picture of the shadow, is not consistent. There's something wrong about it; there's an error. And, the case, what we did again; I did yesterday, by aid of the work of Bruce Director, in the presentation on the question of the Kepler's discovery of gravitation. I just touched on one aspect of that. It's much more complicated than that.

But, the aspect is, that Kepler noted, that in the Aristotelian effort to derive physical principles of the universe, from sense-certainty only, as did Copernicus and then Tycho Brahe; in the attempt to do that, they assumed, that simply observing mathematically--shall we say, "statistically"?--that a certain regularity of pattern, which means essentially circular motion or linear motion: To assume, that that the principle lay in the regularity of this motion, looked at from the circular or linear standpoint.

Now, what Kepler observed is, that, by more precise normalization of the observations of the Solar System, observed that the orbit of Mars was essentially elliptic, not circular. Secondly, that the rate of motion, along the pathway, the trajectory of the orbit, was not uniform motion, but was non- uniform motion. Also, that the orbit was not around the center of the ellipse, but around one of the two centers of the elliptical point.

Now therefore, you have the motion conform to one thing. If you take the area from the position of the Sun, to the perimeter of the orbit; and look at the motion a short distance after that; draw another line from the Sun to the perimeter of the orbit. Now, look at the elliptic area, so defined by that measurement, and Kepler determined, that the area, the amount of area subtended by motion, was always an expression of equal time. That is, that it was equal area, equal time.

Now, this meant that there was a harmonic organization between the two extremes. You have A and B, are two points of the ellipse, central points of the ellipse. One of these points, let's call it A, which for us is generally the Winter season, we're the shortest distance from the Sun; then you have from that, to the Summer season, which is the longest distance to the Sun for us, in the Northern Hemisphere.

Now, you take the two areas, and compare them. Harmonically, they define a harmonic relation. And, he later, in his following book, expanded on this, to show that the organization of the Solar System conformed to something which had to do with these harmonic relations; which Gauss demonstrated, then, at the beginning of the 19th Century, by showing, that happened is, that when Kepler had predicted the existence of a former, disintegrated planet, in an area between Mars and Jupiter, that actually, there was such a disintegrated planet, which is called the Asteroid Belt. Which has, harmonically, the characteristics of the missing planet defined by Kepler.

So therefore, you had with Kepler, the definition of a universal principle, what? In which the principle itself, corresponds to nothing which is intrinsically visible. You don't see gravity. You don't touch it. You see the effects. Ah! Sense perception. The sense organs can react to the effects of gravity, but they don't "see" gravity as such.

That's a principle. Science is based on this notion of the Platonic method.

Now, what happens with the case of the empiricists, with both Aristotle earlier, and with the Aristotelian method used by Claudius Ptolemy, by Copernicus, by Tycho Brahe, there is no principle. There is no universal principle. It's all confined within the interpretation of sense certainty, as being the primary reality. Anything outside sense certainty, is some mysterious thing, which has nothing to do with the physical reality. It's out there. Whereas, in this case, we see that what is invisible, to the senses, can be known by the mind, by examining a paradox, such as the paradoxes addressed by Kepler, in treating the Solar System.

This means an overthrow rejection of Aristotle. It means the overthrow rejection of Galileo. It means the overthrow rejection of all the empiricists, including Euler and Lagrange. This is the method, of course--the method of Kepler, is also the method of Leibniz, on a higher level. So, what happened in the 18th Century, the so-called Newtonian faction--Newton was essentially a bum, who stole everything, that he ever discovered; he was half-true, and he couldn't get it right even then. So, the Newtonian faction, typified by Leonhard Euler, and Lagrange-- Lagrange was a protégé of Euler--attacked Leibniz by saying, "There is no such thing as this infinitesimal. There's nothing outside regularity!" Outside the regularity of what might be called a "Cartesian manifold." That is, the definitions, axioms, and postulates of a Cartesian manifold.

So, what Gauss attacked them for, was this: That, no. There are principles outside the domain of the Cartesian manifold, which actually control the universe. And therefore, you can not derive laws of the universe, physical laws, consistent with a Cartesian manifold. There's a different universe, which is the real universe, whose paradoxes are reflected upon our sense- certainty, which he called the "complex domain." And, it was the denial of the existence of the complex domain, as real, by Euler and Lagrange, which is the problem.

Now, this is a problem of method. The problem of method is denying the existence of efficient forces, in the universe, reality which exists outside sense-certainty. Which we know only by the Platonic method of examining the paradoxes of sense- certainty, and discovering and proving the efficient principles, which cause these aberrations from so-called assumed sense- certainty.

The prevalent method of mathematics and mathematical science, as taught in the English language and other languages, today-- the empiricist method, the positivist method--is to assume, that if you have a sufficiently sophisticated mathematics, you don't need physics. That everything that happens in the universe, can be derived from a mathematics, based on a certain set of fixed definitions, axioms and postulates. The problem is, that the physical scientist, who does experiments, and does important experimental work, before being accredited with this discovery, which may be a genuine discovery, is forced to re- state what he has discovered, in terms defined by Euler, Lagrange, and such successors of Lagrange as Augustin Cauchy, or Clausius, or Boltzmann and so forth.

So therefore, the problem, today, in science, is that the scientist is a prostitute, and there are very few exceptions to it. Every scientist, who does something competent, can get himself certified, or paid, only if he prostitutes himself! He must, having discovered something in one way--validly, by experimental methods--now, has to turn around and prove, that he could have discovered that in a completely different way, consistent with his assumption of sense-certainty. And, it's that moral corruption, which pervades in science today, in the teaching of science, which is the source of the problem you referred to. [applause]

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