Question: Hi. Is there any way to prove that our proof is proof; that is, is there is any way to prove, that the way we think we understand things, isn't all just a delusion of some sort--without appealing to my already possible assumption of your argument; that is, without calling me a Sophist? Because you can't call me a Sophist, unless you presume that such a person exists. And you can only do that, if you don't understand my point before considering it.

For example, a crazy person can think, there are trees talking to him. And he might think that he can prove it by showing you that tree; but, in fact, that's not proof, but he still thinks it.  He also thinks that masses of people agree with him.

That idea is never resolved, the possibility that we are in delusion. Isn't it kind of suspicious? Isn't it there for a reason? That notion, mustn't you be able to transcend it, or resolve it, instead of just ignoring it? Aren't you being dishonest, to just ignore it? Isn't this our fundamental faith? You can't use reason, to refute the notion of transcending reason. And, it's hypocritical to not consider it, yet still pronounce it wrong.

Isn't the only thing that can refute delusion, absolute truth? And, isn't that why delusion sensible, that is, in a sense, within our sense, but also ultimately untrue, unless absolute truth was reachable, but only then?

LaRouche: Ah, we had an argument like that, notably, from the London Tavistock Clinic, of this defense of delusion. You had, also, from other people associated with that, the LSD experiment group, of Aldous Huxley, had this business about delusion. It was very popular; you know, "drop in, drop out" kind of thing.

But that argument breaks down, there is nothing beyond reason. Nothing exists in the universe beyond reason. Therefore, the assumption that something does exist, beyond reason, is a delusion; it's a delusion, which means, it doesn't exist.

The problem, however, is this: It's a problem which was posed, in Judaism, for example, by Philo Judaeus of Alexandria, in which the influence of Aristotle had developed a certain kind of Jewish belief, at that time, that God had created the universe, with all its laws, and by creating a perfect universe, has created a universe which could not be changed. Therefore, God Himself could not intervene to change the universe.

This was this ontological paradox, which is featured by Philo Judaeus or Philo of Alexandria, which had been dealt with by many people.

In other words, if God created the universe, and it's perfect, could God Himself change the universe? Wouldn't that mean that the universe was imperfect, if He changed it?

The universe is a self-developing process. But, there is nothing in the universe, which exists, which defies reason. Therefore, I think what you're doing, is you're getting trapped into the idea, that logic, or formal logic, or deductive argument is reason; it is not. Deductive argument is an absurdity. The best proof of that, of course, is of the type that we see in the 1799 paper by Gauss, attacking Euler and Lagrange: Is that, they insisted on an empiricist model, or a Kantian-like model of the universe. And, that itself, is a fallacy. But they said, "That is reason." And Kant said, there's nothing beyond that, that is knowable by man.

Now, what you're doing, is you're making an argument against Kant--hmm? Immanuel Kant, if you think about it. Or against these guys, Aristotelians, that Philo of Alexandria attacked.

There is nothing beyond reason. But, however, there are idiots, who reduce reason to formal logic, or something like that, or to a formal set of rules. And that is not true. Because the universe is a self- developing process. It is constantly changing. But, it is changing in a way, which is coherent with the principle of reason. Therefore, if we have a good sense of truth, a sense of truth, which agrees with what Philo Judaeus, or Philo of Alexandria, wrote on this question, then we don't have a problem. There is nothing outside reason; but reason is not logic. Logic is inferior to reason. And, there is a higher principle, which is what, for example, we're dealing with in this work, showing the implications of Gauss's attack on Euler and Lagrange, as a paradigm for understanding what we should mean by truth.

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